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Peace-keeping today is in flux, if not in crisis. If it is to serve as a useful instrument in the
maintenance of international peace and security, it needs conceptual clarity, political support, and
financial resources. For peace-keeping to remain effective in a changing world, its credibility must
not be jeopardized by the application of peace-keeping to inappropriate situations, by the issuance
of mandates unsupported by doctrinal consistency or military means, or by the undermining of
its authority by attempts to reconcile peace-keeping with war-making under the rubric of peace-
enforcement.
THE QUEST FOR A BOSNIAN





The general three-body problem, that is the calculation of
the relative motions of three bodies interacting in normal four-
dimensional space, still defies mathematicians in spite of all our
modern tools of calculation. The analogue in international poli-
tics is the three-party conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina,' a quag-
mire in which first Europe and then the entire world have be-
come stuck. The complexity of the problem reflects not only the
intensity of the hatreds that have been fanned between the par-
ties and must now be accounted for in any solution, but that two
of the primary parties have immediate support in neighboring
countries that also have their own bilateral problems to resolve;
furthermore, each of these actors has, for historical or other mo-
tives, its own important patrons among the leading powers of the
world.
Any resolution of these conflicts, whether admittedly tem-
* Legal Adviser, International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The views
expressed herein are personal and do not necessarily represent those of the Confer-
ence.
1. The following terms and abbreviations are used in this Essay for the various
legal personalities described herein:
1. "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" or "BH Republic" for the state that
was admitted to the United Nations in 1992 and that existed under that
name until the signature of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement;
2. "Bosnia and Herzegovina" for the new name of the state as set out in the
new Constitution included in the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement, which is
a continuation of the "BH Republic."
3. "Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina" or "BH Federation" for the Entity
created by the Federation Constitution of March 1994.
4. "Republika Srpska" for the Bosnian Serb Entity.
5. "Entity" is used for the BH Federation and the Republika Srpska as constit-
uent parts of the new "Bosnia and Herzegovina" or as proposed parts of
previous "union" proposals.
6. "Bosnia-Herzegovina" or "Bosnia" are used to refer generally to the geo-
graphic entity, without specifically referring to a particular political struc-
ture.
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porary or designed to be long-term, must address both the legal,
constitutional aspect of the relations between the parties: the
Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, as
well as their geographic relationship. This Essay will address the
former aspect, taking into account geographic factors only to the
extent strictly necessary. The other important ingredients of a
solution: the shifting military situation, the political conflicts
among the potential mediating powers, the "sticks and carrots"
available to them for motivating the immediate parties to accept
proposed solutions, the humanitarian activities, and how to deal
with war crimes will not be addressed here, even though it must
be understood that the achievement of any constitutional settle-
ment and the nature of that settlement is dependent on all these
considerations.
This Essay is divided into two principal parts: first, a brisk
chronological survey of the successive structural proposals that
have been advanced over the past four years; second, an analysis
of the principal legal features of these proposals.
I. PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
A. The Carrington Conference
1. "Treaty Provisions for the Convention"
In September 1991, the Committee of Ministers of the Euro-
pean Community ("EC") convened the EC Peace Conference on
Yugoslavia, also referred to as the "Carrington Conference" after
its chairman, the "Brussels Conference" after its headquarters, or
the "Hague Conference" after its usual venue. The original task
of the Conference was to keep the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia ("SFRY") together as a state, albeit a much looser one
than designed by President Tito in 1974. Following extensive
consultations and negotiations, Lord Carrington in early Novem-
ber 1991 presented a text titled "Treaty Provisions for the Con-
vention,"2 which was designed to accomplish that goal. Though
the leaders of five of the six Yugoslav Republics accepted the text
in principle, President Slobodan Milogevi of Serbia refused to
do so. This ended that phase of the Conference. The proposed
2. A somewhat earlier version of the Treaty Provisions appears in Report of the U.N.
Secretarty-General Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the Security Council Resolution 713, U.N. Secre-
tary-General, Annex VII, at 36, U.N. Doc. S/23169 (1991). The version actually consid-
ered by the Conference on November 4-5, 1991 has not been published.
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text was, in effect, abandoned though its extensive human rights
provisions became the basis of the corresponding parts of all the
later constitutional proposals in respect of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina.
2. The Badinter Commission Opinions
During and at the end of this phase of the Conference, its
Arbitration Commission (known as the "Badinter Commission"
after its President) handed down a number of advisory opinions.
Three of these were of particular significance to the then emerg-
ing Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in that they held that:
(1) though the Bosnian Serbs had a right to self-determination,
this did not imply the right to separate themselves from the fu-
ture state; (2) the internal boundaries of the Republics within
the former SFRY had, on the dissolution of that state, become
international boundaries due the respect such borders are ac-
corded under international law; and (3) the future Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, though it had by December 1991 not
yet formally decided on independence, would be a state worthy
of recognition by the EC and its members once that decision
had been taken.3
3. The Cutileiro Principles
When the failure of the original purpose of the Carrington
Conference became clear at the end of 1991, its charge was redi-
rected to providing for an orderly dissolution of the SFRY, and,
later, also to prevent the threatened disintegration of Bosnia-
Herzegovina when that Republic achieved independence. Just
before independence became irrevocable, the Conference initi-
ated a "Round of Talks on Bosnian Constitutional Arrange-
ments," chaired by Portuguese AmbassadorJos6 Cutileiro, which
culminated on March 18, 1992, in a "Statement of Principles for
new constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina"
(supplemented on March 31st by some additional human rights
principles) .' According to this Statement, Bosnia would have
3. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion Nos. 2, 3 and 4,
January 11, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1497, 1499, 1501 (1992).
4. The three-page Statement of Principles agreed to on March 18, 1992 in Sarajevo
and a supplemental page on human rights agreed to on March 31, 1992 in Brussels
have not been published [hereinafter Cutileiro Principles] (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
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been divided into three substantially autonomous and largely
ethnically defined entities, whose precise borders remained to
be defined; these would only loosely be held together by a weak
central government. Though informally agreed to by the lead-
ers of what were then technically the three political parties rep-
resenting the three major ethnic groups, this solution was almost
immediately denounced. Thereupon independence was de-
clared, international recognition was obtained (soon followed by
U.N. membership'), and the war started, enabling the better
prepared and equipped Serbs, initially with the assistance of the
Yugoslav Army, to occupy quickly well over half of the country.
B. The London Conference
The failure of the EC Conference to prevent the disintegra-
tion of Yugoslavia led to the convening, jointly by the United
Nations and the EC, of the London International Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia, which met on August 26-27, 1992.6 The
Conference, inter alia, adopted a Statement on Bosnia, which af-
firmed "respect for the integrity of the present frontiers" of that
country, meaning that it should not be broken up. The State-
ment also called for the implementation of strong human rights
provisions and, particularly, for the reversal of what had come to
be known as "ethnic cleansing."
The London Conference established the International Con-
ference on the Former Yugoslavia ("ICFY'), then referred to as
the "Vance-Owen Negotiations" after the first Co-Chairmen of its
Steering Committee, or the "Geneva Conference" after its head-
quarters in the Palais des Nations. One of the six Working
Groups of that Conference was the group on Bosnia-Herzego-
vina.
C. International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
1. Consideration of 5 Alternatives
Soon after the initial rounds of consultations with the three
Bosnian parties within the ICFY Working Group On Bosnia-Her-
zegovina, the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY Steering Committee, Cy-
5. G.A. Res. 46/237, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at 92-35305, U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/
237 (1992).
6. Documents adopted at the London Conference, Aug. 26-27, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
1527, 1531-48.
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rus Vance and Lord Owen, considered five alternative ap-
proaches to the constitutional quandary:
(i) A centralized state, logical for a country of only 4.5 mil-
lion and desired by the Muslims who with 45% of the popula-
tion had a solid plurality and with a higher birthrate could
soon hope for an absolute majority - but for this reason
quite unacceptable to the Serbs and the Croats;
(ii) A federal state of 7 to 14 "provinces," each with a marked
ethnic character but also containing minorities from the
other groups;
(iii) Three ethnically characterized "republics" loosely con-
federated in a "union" - in effect, the Cutileir0 solution;
(iv) Three ethnically characterized independent states, with
only normal neighborly ties - the solution ostensibly sought
by the Serbs and also by the Croats;
(v) Absorption of the Serb areas of Bosnia into Serbia and of
the Croat areas into the Republic of Croatia, hopefully leav-
ing a viable Muslim state as the remaining Bosnia.
Of these, the Co-Chairmen considered options (iv) and (v) be-
yond their mandate, because these would not preserve the terri-
torial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as required, inter alia, by
the London Declaration. Solution (iii) was considered unstable,
as a mere prelude to (iv) (as (iv) would be to (v)). Solution (i),
on the other hand, was unacceptable to the representatives of
about half the population.
2. Precursor to the Vance-Owen Plan
Consequently, after some further consultations with the
three Bosnian parties within the ICFY Working Group, the Co-
Chairmen, at the end of October 1992, presented to the U.N.
Security Council, the ICFY Steering Committee, and to the par-
ties themselves, a relatively detailed "Proposed Constitutional
Structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina" ("Precursor to VOP")
based on ICFY option (ii) above.7 However, the Co-Chairmen
did not at that time specify into precisely how many provinces
Bosnia was to be divided, nor did they give any indication of
which areas they would propose to allocate to each of the three
parties. The latter, thereupon, announced that they could not
7. See Report of the Secretary-General on the International Conference on the Former Yugosla-
via, U.N. Secretary-General, Annex VII, at 45, U.N. Doc. S/24795 (1992). The princi-
pal document contains extensive explanations of these provisions.
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discuss the Constitutional Proposals in the abstract and attempts
made in the Working Group to elicit constructive reactions were
largely unsuccessful.
3. The Vance-Owen Plan
On January 2, 1993, the ICFY for the first time convened a
meeting at which the three Bosnian parties sat at the same table
- with the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadi , supported
by the Presidents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY'),
Serbia, and Montenegro and the Bosnian Croat leader, Mate
Boban, supported by the President of Croatia. The Co-Chair-
men presented a package of three proposals,8 which in the
course of negotiations during the following months (first contin-
uing in Geneva and then in New York) was expanded to include
a fourth:
(i) A draft "Agreement Relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina,"
the core of which consisted of 10 (later reduced to 9 by com-
bining two) briefly expressed Constitutional Principles,
largely derived from the earlier Constitutional Proposals;
(ii) A proposed map dividing the country into 10 "Prov-
inces," three each with a predominantly, but not exclusively,
Muslim, Serb, or Croat ethnic character plus a multiethnic
Sarajevo;
(iii) A draft "Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina," largely developed by the military leaders of the three
parties meeting under the chairmanship of the United Na-
tions Protection Force ("UNPROFOR") Commander, specify-
ing detailed arrangements for the cessation of hostilities and
the withdrawal of forces under UNPROFOR supervision;
(iv) An "Agreement on Interim Measures" to bridge the gap
between the ongoing warfare and the implementation of the
proposed decentralization of Bosnia under a constitution
conforming to the Constitutional Principles. 9
Although the Bosnian Croats rapidly and repeatedly ac-
cepted all parts of the so-called Vance-Owen Plan ("VOP"), the
8. Report of the Secretay-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Secretary-General, Annex V, Annex VI, Annex VII, at 16, 19, 20,
U.N. Doc. S/25050 (1993).
9. Report of the Secretay-Ceral on the Activities of the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia: Peace Talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. Secretary-General, An-
nexes I-IV, at 27-36, U.N. Doc. S/25479 (1993) [hereinafter Peace Talks on Bosnia and
Herzegovina].
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proposed map being particularly favorable to them, the Muslims
only reluctantly acceded to all the elements, towards the end of
March. The Bosnian Serbs held out until May, when under
great pressure from the Serb leadership in Serbia and the FRY,
they signed subject to ratification by their Assembly; the latter
quickly forbade ratification and then organized a referendum
that overwhelmingly confirmed that decision.
4. A Muslim-Croat Interlude
In the wake of the Serb rejection of the VOP, which coin-
cided with the departure of Cyrus Vance and his replacement by
Thorvald Stoltenberg, 10 the Co-Chairmen tried to encourage the
Bosnian Muslims and Croats (both of whom were then still nom-
inally participating in the government of the BH Republic) to
establish joint arrangements along the lines of the VOP to gov-
ern at least the territories that they then controlled. Legal ex-
perts of the two groups met under the chairmanship of the ICFY
Legal Adviser on May 31 and June 1, 1993 and reached substan-
tial agreement on draft instruments, designed to be promul-
gated either as legislative decrees of the existing BH Assembly or
as agreements between the leaders of the two parties, on the fol-
lowing subjects:
(i) Ombudsmen;
(ii) A Human Rights Court;
(iii) A list of international human rights instruments to
be incorporated into any constitutional or legislative arrange-
ments;
(iv) An International Human Rights Monitoring Mis-
sion;
(v) A Military Committee; and
(vi) The Establishment and Governance of the Prov-
inces."
Although this initiative was quickly abandoned, draft instru-
ments (i), (ii), and (iii) became the bases of corresponding pro-
visions that appeared in most later constitutional proposals.
10. Former Foreign Minister of Norway and also, briefly, U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees ("UNHCR").
11. These drafts have not been published. They are on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal.
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5. The Invincible Plan
In late July and early August 1993, intensive tripartite nego-
tiations in Geneva under the Co-Chairmen produced by far the
most detailed and consequently complex peace package, 12 which
took its name from the British carrier HMS Invincible on which
the final details were negotiated on September 20th. At its heart
was a proposed Constitutional Agreement, largely reverting to
the Cutileiro Principles and to ICFY option (iii) that in October
1992 had been rejected by the Co-Chairmen: three largely eth-
nic "Republics" loosely held together in a weak "Union." The
proposed map allocated about 30% of Bosnian territory to the
Muslim Republic, compared with some 36% allocated to the
Muslim majority provinces under the VOP, and there were com-
plex arrangements for protected routes largely through Serb ter-
ritory connecting various separated areas of the Muslim and
Croat Republics, as well as provisions for access to the Adriatic at
Neum and Ploce (in Croatia). Though, in principle, all the con-
stitutional and related arrangements were agreed upon, the In-
vincible Plan was quickly rejected by the Muslims as offering
them insufficient territory.
6. The European Union Plan
Soon after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in
November 1993, the foreign ministers of the new European
Union ("EU") launched an initiative to revive the Invincible
Plan: they offered the FRY a relaxation of the severe sanctions
regime that had been imposed because of its complicity in the
start of the Bosnian war, if the Bosnian Serbs would agree to
allocate at least one-third of Bosnian territory to the Muslims.
This proposal led to several rounds of intensive negotiations in
Geneva and Brussels, at the conclusion of which the Serbs, who
were then holding about 70% of Bosnia, tentatively agreed that
the Muslims should have about 33.3% and the Croats 17.5%.
12. The final Invincible Plan has not been published in any document, but a
slightly earlier version was set out in a Letter Dated 20 August 1993 From the Secretary-
General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
S/26337/Add.1 (1993). This letter does not, however, include some of the texts negoti-
ated immediately before or at the Invincible meeting on September 20, 1993. Some of
these texts are set out in a Letter Dated 23 September 1993 From the Secretaty-General Ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Secretary-General, Annex, Appendix at
2, 6, U.N. Doc. S/26486 (1993).
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There was, however, no agreement as to the precise adjustments
to be made to the Invincible map, and, meanwhile, other parts
of that package began to unravel - in particular the provisions
relating to a possible dissolution of the Union and the territorial
consequences that would flow from such an event. About mid-
January 1994, the attempt to rescue the Invincible Plan was aban-
doned.
7. Muslim-Croat Negotiations
Even before the demise of the Invincible Plan, a series of
inconclusive meetings took place between Bosnian Muslim, Bos-
nian Croat, and Republic of Croatia representatives, in early Jan-
uary 1994, in Vienna and Bonn, under the sponsorship of the
ICFY and the German Government (which at that time held the
EU Presidency). At the last of these meetings, the President of
Croatia proposed to the Bosnian President the possibility of es-
tablishing a Muslim-Croat entity within Bosnia, which would
maintain strong ties to the Republic of Croatia. At that time,
however, President Izetbegovi was not interested in President
Tudjman's proposal.
D. Under U.S. Auspices: Establishment of the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina
After the effective abandonment of all the above-mentioned
initiatives, and as a consequence of the public shock created by a
shell that killed 68 persons in a Sarajevo market13 and the subse-
quent spate of UNPROFOR/NATO activity that resulted in the
temporary removal of Serbian heavy weapons from the hills sur-
rounding Sarajevo, the United States sponsored a new round of
negotiations among the Bosnian Muslims (who now denomi-
nated themselves as "Bosniacs" to emphasize their allegedly non-
ethnic, non-religious character), the Bosnian Croats, and the Re-
public of Croatia. Following the rough outline of the earlier
Tudjman proposal, rapid negotiations in Washington first re-
sulted in a "Framework Agreement for the Federation" and an
"Outline of a Preliminary Agreement on the Principles and
Foundations for the Establishment of a Confederation between
13. SeeJohn Kifnier, Conflict in the Balkans: UN. Reports Serbs are Pulling Back Around
Sarajevo Safe Area, N.Y. TIMS, Feb. 18, 1994, at Al (reporting explosion of shell in Sara-
jevo marketplace).
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the Republic of Croatia and the Federation," which were signed
on March 1, 1994, in Washington. 4 The venue then shifted to
the U.S. Embassy in Vienna, where the parties agreed on a "Pro-
posed Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina"1" and a "Preliminary Agreement Concerning the Establish-
ment of a Confederation Between the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia,"16 which were signed
at the White House on March 18th. On March 30th, the Federa-
tion Constitution was adopted by a specially constructed Consti-
tutional Assembly and thereby immediately entered into force
even though the boundaries of the eight "Cantons" into which
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("BH Federation")
was to be divided had not yet been defined. By May 11, 1994,
these cantonal boundaries and a constitutional amendment to
resolve a particular difficulty about two of the cantons were
agreed upon. The constitutional amendment was formally
adopted by the Constituent Assembly some weeks later.
1 7
The Federation Constitution, in effect, constitutes a rever-
sion to the VOP (an ICFY option (ii) approach), but limited to
just two ethnic parties, in that it divides the Federation into eight
Cantons: four Bosniac (Muslim), two Croat, and two mixed. The
relationship between the Cantons and the central government,
and the governmental organs of the latter, are similar to those
foreseen in the Proposed Constitutional Structure for Bosnia
and Herzegovina that constituted the Precursor to the VOP.
Actual implementation of the Federation Constitution
proved to be much more difficult than its negotiation. Even
though the six-month transitional period provided for in that
instrument expired on September 30, 1994, and no constitu-
tional amendment could be agreed upon to formally extend this
period, few steps to establish the Federation were taken until
early 1995, when a series of meetings of the two parties' leaders
took place under German and U.S. auspices. Though agree-
14. Letter Dated 3 March 1994 From the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and Hezego-
vina and Croatia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Secretary-
General, Attachment II, at 13, U.N. Doc. S/1994/255 (1994).
15. Proposed Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mar. 18,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 740.
16. Preliminary Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Confederation Be-
tween the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, Mar. 18,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 611.
17. Id. at 781.
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ments were reached on a number of details and particularly on
schedules, at the time of this writing, the Federation has not yet
really started operating. The difficulties are evident: aside from
the continuing hostility, particularly at the local level, between
the Muslims and the Croats, who are united principally by their
conflict with the Bosnian Serbs, the problem is an unprece-
dented one (which would also have had to be faced by the VOP):
how to create a federal structure where the subordinate entities
(i.e. the Cantons) have no historical basis and must themselves
be constructed as a first step in achieving the Federation.
E. The Contact Group
1. The Leaderless Period
With the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, in principle, united
in the BH Federation, it remained to reach some sort of accom-
modation between the new Federation and the Bosnian Serbs,
who until recently occupied some 70% of Bosnian territory.
Such an accommodation had to have at least two aspects to re-
late the two entities in some acceptable way: a territorial division
and a constitutional structure. To help resolve these issues, a
Contact Group of the United States, Russia, France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom was established in May 1994 in associa-
tion with ICFY. The Group, which could only act by consensus,
decided to concentrate first on the territorial issue; basing itself
on a 51/49 division, 8 the Contact Group, after extensive consul-
tations and consideration, on July 6, 1994, presented to the par-
ties a proposed map dividing the country. The Federation lead-
ership unenthusiastically accepted this proposal while the Bos-
nian Serbs in effect rejected it - objecting not so much to the
quantity of land but to its strategic placement and quality.
With respect to the constitutional issue, the Contact Group
made little progress. Though it informally consulted with both
parties at one early session, it never formally agreed on any text.
In July 1994, a provisional set of principles was informally passed
to the parties and, late in the year, brief consideration was given
to a full text of a Union Constitution. That text again consti-
tuted an ICFY option (iii) approach, though now limited to two
18. This ratio derived from two separate and reluctant Serb concessions in January
1994 to allow 33.3% of Bosnian territory for the Muslims and 17.5% for the Croats,
which together amounted to 50.8%.
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participants: the Muslim-Croat BH Federation (itself an ICFY
option (ii) construct) and the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska. 19
Because of the Bosnian Serb unwillingness to accept the Contact
Group map even as a basis for negotiations, the Group's efforts
to achieve a full agreement were aborted and the constitutional
proposals were not further developed or ever formally presented
to or discussed with the parties.
2. With U.S. Leadership: The September 1995 Preliminary
Agreements
In the summer of 1995, with the Contact Group effectively
stymied, another particularly murderous shell hit Sarajevo and
again NATO sprung into action, though this time more sus-
tainedly than in February 1994.20 Once more the United States
took the lead in a fresh set of negotiations: this time, between
the Governments of the BH Republic and the BH Federation on
the one hand, and of the Republika Srpska (now formally repre-
sented by Serbian President MilogeviE) on the other. Intensive
shuttle diplomacy, largely by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State,
Richard Holbrooke, achieved two very partial constitutional
agreements: one reached in Geneva on September 8th and the
other in New York on September 26th.21 These fragments fol-
lowed the general outlines of the tentative Contact Group paper
- i.e. the replacement of the existing BH Republic by an ICFY
option (iii) construct with two entities: the BH Federation and
the Republika Srpska, with most of the details of their relation-
ship to be agreed later.
3. With U.S. Leadership: The Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement
From November 1st to the 21st, 1995, the "Bosnia Proximity
Peace Talks" were held at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
near Dayton, Ohio, nominally under the auspices of the Contact
19. See Conflict in the Balkans: The Agreement; A Framework for Bosnia: Text of an Accord
by Three Governments, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at A10 (defining Republika Srpska).
20. See Roger Cohen, Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview; NATO Presses Bosnia Bomb-
ing, Vowing to Make Sarajevo Safe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1995, at Al (describing reasons for
NATO air strikes).
21. See Conflict in the Balkans: Details of Accord: Division Within Unity, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 1995, at A4 (reporting details of accord); Elaine Sciolino, Conflict in the Balkans:
The Overview; Enemies in Bosnia Devise Structure for a Government, N.Y. TiMS, Sept. 27,
1995, at Al (describing new governmental structure).
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Group but effectively under the management of the U.S. State
Department. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was rep-
resented by President Izetbegovi , Prime Minister Silajdzic, and
Foreign Minister Sacirbey, the Republic of Croatia by. a delega-
tion headed at the beginning and end by President Tudjman
and otherwise by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for For-
eign Affairs Granic, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by Presi-
dent MilogeviE of Serbia, who also represented the Republika
Srpska though some of its senior officials were present, and the
BH Federation by President Kresimir Zubak; the Contact Group
states were generally represented at the level of Political Director
of the respective Foreign Offices, except that Secretary of State
Christopher and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke represented the
United States.
The principal product of this session22 was a General Frame-
work Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("GFA")
to be concluded between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia and to be witnessed by representatives of the five Contact
Group states and the Special Negotiator for the European
Union. Texts of the following eleven agreements are annexed to
the GFA, to be concluded between various combinations of par-
ties and to be supplemented by some subsidiary agreements and
side-letters: (1A) Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, plus
Status-of-Forces Agreements between NATO and Bosnia and
NATO and Croatia, and a Transit Agreement between NATO
and the FRY; (IB) Agreement on Regional Stabilization; (2) In-
ter-Entity Boundaries; (3) Elections; (4) BH Constitution2 1; (5)
Arbitration; (6) Human Rights; (7) Refugees and Displaced Per-
sons; (8) Commission to Preserve National Monuments; (9) BH
Public Corporations; (10) Civilian Implementation; and (11) In-
ternational Police Task Force. In addition, there were nearly a
score of additional side-letters, a Concluding Statement in the
22. See Letter Dated 29 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretay General, U.N. Doc. A/50/790
and S/1995/999 (1995) [hereinafter Letter Dated 29 November 1995]. These texts are
also to appear in the January 1996 issue of International Legal Materials.
23. The "Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina" is, unlike the other Annexes to
the GFA. not in the form of an agreement, but sets out the text of the Constitution with
the indicated tide. However, it is supported by three identically worded Declarations by
respectively: the BH Republic, the BH Federation, and the Republika Srpska, stating
that these "approve" the Constitution.
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nature of a Final Act, and even an Agreement on Initialling the
GFA. All of these were appropriately initialled on November 21st
- except that initials for the Republika Srpska were only added
three days later in Pale. Earlier by-products of the session were a
November 10th "Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina"2 4 and a November 12th "Ba-
sic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Sirmium" - a text relating to Croatia rather than to
Bosnia, but constituting an important political precondition for
the Bosnian settlement. It should be noted that the BH Constitu-
tion and the related texts agreed to in Dayton, in addition to
being far more detailed than the above-mentioned preliminary
understandings achieved in September, differ from these in
some important respects, which will be pointed out in the follow-
ing section.
As they undertook in the above-mentioned Agreement on
Initialling, the respective parties to the several agreements
signed these at the Paris Peace Conference on December 14,
thus putting the GFA and all the other agreements into force on
that day. On December 8-9, a Peace Implementation Confer-
ence took place in London and other related conferences on
pledging and on military arrangements are scheduled to be held
in various European capitals.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Throughout these extended and multiple rounds of negoti-
ations, numerous issues kept recurring, for the most part directly
related to the central question of the future political character of
Bosnia: the Muslims desire a unitary, centralized state in which
they would enjoy a large plurality and probably soon a majority
because of their higher birthrate and the likelihood that some
Serbs and Croats would voluntarily depart for the greater conge-
niality of Serbia and Croatia; the Serbs and Croats do not want to
live in a Muslim-dominated state and therefore strive for as com-
plete independence for their areas as they can attain. The fol-
lowing sections briefly present, separately as far as possible, each
24. Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina of 10 November 1995 [hereinafter Dayton Federation Agreement] (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
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of these intertwined issues, indicating their development over
the past 40 months.
A. The Structure of Bosnia-Hzegovina
Although, as illustrated above, the ICFY theoretical options
concerning the structure of Bosnia range widely from a central-
ized state to complete dissolution and substantial absorption
into neighboring countries, the variants that have received seri-
ous consideration have almost exclusively centered around two
of the five ICFY options discussed: a more or less centralized
federal state of roughly ten quasi-ethnic provinces (ICEY option
(ii)) and a more or less loose union of three ethnic entities
(ICFY option (iii)). In effect, the differences between the vari-
ous models can best be characterized by two parameters: the
distribution of governmental powers between the central state
and the subsidiary entities; and the potential effectiveness of the
central government.
The Vance-Owen Plan, its Precursor, and the BH Federa-
tion, albeit encompassing only two of the three ethnic groups,
illustrate ICFY option (ii) approaches. The Cutileiro Principles
and the Invincible Plan in all its variants, as well as the proposed
Union between the Federation and the Republika Srpska consid-
ered by the Contact Group and in a considerably altered form
the state of "Bosnia and Herzegovina" created by the Dayton/
Paris Peace Agreement, all constitute ICFY option (iii) ap-
proaches: the first two in trilateral forms and the latter in bilat-
eral form.
B. Continuity of Bosnia-Herzegovina
1. The Issue of Legal Continuity
During the negotiations leading to the Invincible Plan, a
somewhat "theological" issue surfaced: whether the Bosnia that
emerges from these travails should be considered a legal contin-
uation of the present Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or as
a completely new state. The Muslims insist on the former, in
part for emotional reasons and in part for practical ones, such as
continuity of membership in international organizations and of
other treaty relations, and of status as the complaining party
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before the ICJ in the action filed against the FRY25 for allegedly
abetting genocide in Bosnia.16 The Serbs on the other hand did
not wish to accept the legality of the establishment of the BH
Republic, as they contested the propriety of its separation from
the SFRY without Serb consent, or alternatively insisted that
upon such separation two or three states had been created:
their own Republika Srpska and either a Muslim-Croat entity or
separate Muslim and Croat ones.
In the "Constitutional Agreement of the Union of Republics
of Bosnia and Herzegovina" at the heart of the Invincible Plan,
this problem was finessed by the statement in Article 1.1, that
"It]he Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a
member state of the United Nations," thus implying, without ex-
plicitly stating, that the Union is a legal continuation of the Re-
public, which already had such membership. On the other
hand, the very first point agreed during the September 1995
rounds of negotiations was that: "Bosnia and Herzegovina will
continue its legal existence with its present borders and continu-
ing international recognition" - which resolved this matter in
favor of the Muslim position. The new BH Constitution contains
an expanded form of essentially the same provision, reinforced
by the phrase that "[Bosnia and Herzegovina] shall remain a
Member State of the United Nations.."27
Always related to the resolution of this issue was the ques-
tion of whether a new BH constitution was to attain legal status
by an amendment of the present Constitution of the Republic -
thus implying continuity - or would instead attain force as an
agreement between the parties, perhaps subject to ratification by
their respective legislatures or by referenda - which would im-
ply a new start for the State; conceivably this point could have
been bridged by using both approaches simultaneously. The
new BH Constitution provides that:
This Constitution shall enter into force upon signature of the
25. The FRY's own international legal status as a continuation of the former SFRY
is also somewhat unclear. See Paul C. Szasz, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, 88 PROC.
A.S.I.L. 33, 37-39 (1993); Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and
Membership in the United Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29, 52-65 (1995).
26. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, 1993 I.C.J. 3; Order of
13 September 1993, 1993 I.C.J. 325.
27. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CONST. art. 1.1 [hereinafter BH CONST.].
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General Framework Agreement as a constitutional act amend-
ing and superseding the Constitution of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina 2 8
As in one of the side-letters to Annex 4 to the GFA, the BH Re-
public "approves of the [new BH] Constitution," the Republic is
presumably bound to adopt the necessary amendment to its
Constitution to implement the above provision. Technically,
however, the legal force of the Constitution might also be con-
sidered as deriving from the approval of the text by the three
authorities that, collectively, arguably represent all Bosnians, i.e.
the BH Republic, the BH Federation, and the Republika Srpska,
which is internationally reinforced by GFA Article V:
The Parties [i.e. the BH Republic, the Republic of Croatia
and the FRY] welcome and endorse the arrangements that
have been made concerning the Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as set forth in Annex 4. The Parties shall fully
respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made
therein.2
9
As to the continuity of BH membership in the United Na-
tions, this is a matter for the General Assembly, acting on a rec-
ommendation of the Security Council. As continuity is desired
by the Muslim party and, thus, by the Government that currently
represents Bosnia in the United Nations and enjoys majority sup-
port in both the political organs, it is likely to be accepted.
Finally, Annex II to the Constitution on "Transitional Ar-
rangements" provides for the continuation, subject to a few con-
ditions, of all laws, regulations, and judicial rules (para. 2), of all
pending judicial and administrative proceedings (para. 3), and
of governmental bodies (para. 4) in force or operating "within
the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina." This would seem to
include laws and institutions of the BH Republic, the BH Federa-
tion (including possibly the Croatian Herzog-Bosna), and the
Republika Srpska.
2. The Eventual Dissolution of the State
A somewhat related and far more important issue is whether
and under what conditions Bosnia and Herzegovina might even-
28. Id. art. XII. 1.
29. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina art. V in
Letter Dated 29 November 1995, supra note 22. [hereinafter GFA].
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tually be dissolved. This matter first arose in last-minute Muslim-
Serb negotiations that preceded the Invincible meeting and was
reflected in that package through provisions that would have al-
lowed the people of any of the three Constituent Republics to
opt by referendum, to be held within two years of the creation of
the proposed Union and after all territorial issues had been re-
solved (an inducement to the Serbs to agree to a resolution), to
choose to leave the Union - in which event international legal
continuity of the Union would vest in the Muslim Republic. Inci-
dentally, another earlier and somewhat inconsistent provision
still remained in the draft Constitutional Agreement under
which any party that objected to the withdrawal of another could
appeal to the Security Council, whose decision would be bind-
ing.
In the later EU-sponsored negotiations to rescue the Invin-
cible Plan, this dissolution provision created an unanticipated
difficulty. If the Union were to be dissolved - most likely on
Serb initiative - then the Muslims wished to preserve for them-
selves the benefits of the access-to-the-sea provisions that consti-
tuted an important part of the Invincible Plan. Such access,
however, could only be attained through the proposed Bosnian
Croat Republic and, in part, through the Republic of Croatia
itself - and these were naturally reluctant to meet the Muslim
concerns for the eventuality that the Serbs might cause the
Union to dissolve. The failure to resolve these issues contrib-
uted, at least to some extent, to the eventual abandonment of
the Invincible Plan.
The Federation Constitution, to which the Serbs are not
parties, has no dissolution provision.
Though the geographic issues thus in effect disappeared,
the Contact Group, in tentatively exploring constitutional princi-
ples with the leaders of the BH Federation and the Republika
Srpska, discovered that the very issue of dissolution constituted
one of the major and seemingly unbridgeable differences be-
tween the parties. The new BH Constitution is entirely silent as
to the possibility of dissolution, which, of course, was the Muslim
objective.
C. Geography-Related Questions
This Essay does not address the arguments about or the res-
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olution of the boundaries between the areas controlled by the
three ethnic groups, or between the Muslim-Croat areas on the
one hand and the Serb areas on the other, except to recall that,
from the beginning, this constituted one of the two basic
problems (the other being the constitutional one) that would
have to be resolved. The 51/49 territorial ratio that grew out of
the EU Action Plan was formalized by the Contact Group and
constituted an agreed basis of the final negotiations. Though
this ratio is not mentioned explicitly in the Peace Agreement, it
is in effect embodied in the maps appended to the Agreement
on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues that consti-
tutes Annex 2 to the GFA. But, though the ratio was strictly
maintained, the actual territorial division differs considerably
from that proposed by the Contact Group, largely but not exclu-
sively by reflecting the military developments during the summer
of 1995.30
1. Legal Nature of Internal Boundaries
From the beginning it was recognized that it was important
to specify the nature of any boundaries that would be drawn
within Bosnia. For one thing, if the state would not constitute a
customs union - which was a natural consequence of any ICFY
option (ii) construct but not necessarily of an ICFY option (iii)
one - then some inter-entity boundary controls would be neces-
sary.
The Precursor to the VOP provided that "There are to be
no border controls at inter-provincial boundaries, and full free-
dom of movement be allowed throughout the entire country."3 '
The Invincible Plan was similar, also providing for the "free
movement of persons, goods and services throughout the terri-
tory. '3 2 This matter is not addressed in the Federation Constitu-
tion, as the BH Federation is sufficiently centralized that these
questions should, in principle, not even arise. Although during
the first twenty months of the Federation's nominal existence
30. It should be noted that the Peace Agreement left unsettled the status of the
Brcko area, which is to be determined within one year by arbitration. GFA, supra note
29, Annex 2, Art. V.
31. Report of the Seretaty-eal on the International Conference on the Former Yugosla-
via, supra note 7, Annex VII, I.B.4, at 45.
32. Letter Dated 20 August 1993 From the Secretay-General Addressed to the President of
the Security Council, supra note 12, Appendix I, art. 11.1(d), at 6.
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intra-Federation Bosniac/Croat borders constituted a real prob-
lem, the November 10th Dayton Federation Implementation
Agreement provides that by December 10, 1995 "all internal cus-
toms checkpoints in the Federation will be eliminated and full
freedom of movement shall be established."3 3
The new BH Constitution provides:
Movement of Goods, Services, Capital and Persons. There shall be
freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities shall not impede
full freedom of movement of persons, goods, services, and
capital throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Neither Entity
shall establish controls at the boundary between the Enti-
ties. 34
However, armed forces of either Entity may not enter into the
territory of the other without due permission. 5
2. Status of Sarajevo and Mostar
The VOP would have made Sarajevo one of the ten "prov-
inces" of Bosnia - the one truly multi-ethnic one - and also
the capital of the country. With the abandonment of that Plan,
it became necessary to resolve to which of the ethnic "Republics"
Sarajevo would be assigned or how it would be divided between
the Serb and the Muslim, or the Muslim-Croat entities.
In part to temporize on the resolution of this issue, the In-
vincible Plan would have placed Sarajevo under U.N. administra-
tion for about two years. This was also proposed by the Contact
Group - though in the map that it formulated it foresaw the
eventual division of Sarajevo on a 2:1 basis between the BH Fed-
eration and the Republika Srpska, unless the Serbs could be in-
duced to surrender that claim in return for territorial conces-
sions elsewhere. The Federation Constitution itself, while
designating Sarajevo as its capital, does not indicate whether and
how it is to fit into the cantonal scheme into which the rest of
the Federation territory is divided - presumably tacitly ac-
cepting that for some time the Sarajevo District would be under
international administration.
The maps adopted as part of the Peace Agreement assign all
33. Dayton Federation Agreement, supra note 24, § II.B.2, 3.
34. BH CONST. art. 1.4.
35. Id. art. V.5.(a).
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of Sarajevo, including a number of Serb suburbs, uncondition-
ally to the Federation, without any period of international ad-
ministration.
As to Mostar, bitterly contested between the Muslims and
the Croats, the BH Federation, once legally established,
promptly arranged for that city to be administered for two years
by the European Union. That arrangement was unchanged by
the Peace Agreement.
3. Protected Routes
Because it was considered impossible to divide Bosnia in
such a way that all areas of like ethnicity would be contiguous,
substantial effor~was expended on devising solutions that would
permit isolated areas to be at least connected to each other. Evi-
dently, to the extent that one party would be permitted to con-
nect its territory by the use of corridors over which it would have
sovereign control (and whose width would be a matter of strate-
gic importance), the areas of the other party, on either side of
such corridors, could not be similarly connected. If the constitu-
tion provided for relatively open boundaries and for mutual de-
militarization (see H below), then this situation would not con-
stitute a serious problem; however in the event of controlled bor-
ders and, especially, if either party wished to maintain the right
to move military forces, then practical solutions must be found.
The Invincible Plan provided for the establishment of a
jointly controlled Access Authority "to guarantee full freedom of
movement in certain essential areas between and within the
Constituent Republics, and also to and from these Republics to
the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia." 6 Thirteen
roads and railroads were to be controlled by the Authority.
When it was not immediately clear how many isolated en-
claves would be foreseen by the definitive Contact Group propo-
sal, the Group considered a complex system of protected routes,
protected transport centres (i.e. points where two areas of one
entity and two of another would meet at a point), cross-overs
(where one entity would have a right to construct a tunnel under
or a bridge over a narrow sovereign corridor of the other), and
fly-over rights. Each of these arrangements would have been
36. Letter Dated 20 August 1993 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of
the Security Council, supra note 12, Appendix II, Part 1, 1 2, at 20-21.
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governed by complex rules as to types of traffic allowed, controls
that the two parties could enforce, and at least a transitional in-
ternational presence. As the ultimate map proposed was rela-
tively simpler, these options were, at that point, not explored fur-
ther, though some arrangements for connecting at least Bihac to
the main body of the BH Federation would have been necessary.
Because of military developments shortly before the final
negotiations, it was ultimately almost possible to separate the
Federation and the Republika Srpska through a single - if
quite convoluted - line, so that potentially only one protected
route may be necessary: to connect two small enclaves north of
the Posavina Corridor with the main territory of the Federation.
In respect of the corridor connecting Sarajevofand Gorazde it
was considered prudent to provide in the Agreement on the Mil-
itary Aspect of the Peace Settlement37 that until a two-lane all-
weather road can be constructed within the Gorazde Corridor
two interim routes were designated to be used by both Entities,
subject to specified conditions.
4. Access to Sea
Bosnia is basically a landlocked country. Its one contact
point with the Adriatic is at the fishing village of Neum on the
Dalmatian coast, but that area lies behind a massive Croat penin-
sula. Consequently, Bosnia could only claim a minimal territo-
rial sea of its own and, in any event, could not reach the sea
without passing through Croatian territorial waters. Moreover,
technical investigations of Neum have shown that it would be
completely impractical to establish a harbor there.
These issues became important during the Invincible Plan
negotiations, which ultimately contained a series of complex
provisions relating to:
(a) Access of the Muslim Republic to Neum, through the
Bosnian Croat Republic;
(b) Access of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Croatian port of
Ploce (which had originally been built to serve as the natural
harbor for Bosnia), by an agreement to be concluded with
the Republic of Croatia.
(c) An agreement with Croatia for the application by Croatia
37. GFA, supra note 29, Annex 1A, art. IV.2(c) (Goradze).
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to Bosnia of the Landlocked States Convention, in return
for transit rights for Croatia from the northern part of its ter-
ritory through Bosnia to the Dalmatian coast.
As mentioned above, the interaction of these access-to-sea provi-
sions with those relating to the potential dissolution of Bosnia
ultimately made it difficult to salvage the Invincible Plan.
As also mentioned above, parallel to the negotiation of the
Federation Constitution, it was also agreed that there be a Con-
federation between the BH Federation and Croatia, potentially
including a customs and monetary union. Nevertheless, it was
also decided to annex to the planned Confederation Agreement
the Ploce access agreement mentioned in (b) above, coupled
with another agreement that would guarantee to Croatia undis-
turbed road traffic through Neum, to connect the north-western
with the south-eastern parts of the Dalmatian coast.3 9 Later,
when the idea of an early Confederation was abandoned and
even the eventual conclusion of such an arrangement became
doubtful, these two transit agreements were concluded sepa-
rately between the Bosnian and the Croatian Governments in
September 1994.
Because of the above-mentioned arrangements concerning
the BH Federation and the freedom-of-movement provisions in
the new BH Constitution 40 no access-to-sea issues had to be dealt
with in the Peace Agreement.
D. Distribution of Governmental Powers
One of the two principal factors that can be adjusted in de-
signing a compromise governmental structure to meet, as far as
possible, the divergent views of the Bosnian parties, is the alloca-
tion of powers between the Central Government and that of the
"constituent entities," be these "states," "republics," ". provinces,"
or "cantons." The Muslims naturally wished for the central pow-
ers to be as broad as possible, while the Serbs and, to an extent,
38. Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States, July 8, 1965, 597 U.N.T.S.
3, 4 I.L.M. 957.
39. Agreement Granting the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Access to the
Adriatic Through the Territory of the Republic of Croatia, Mar. 18, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 613;
Agreement Between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of
Croatia Granting Croatia Transit Through the Federation, Mar. 18, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 616.
40. BH CONST. art. 1.4.
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the Croats preferred to allocate at most minimal powers to the
center.
This issue was already addressed, albeit only tacitly, in the
Cutileiro Principles, which would have allocated only the follow-
ing powers to the central government: "Central Bank and mone-
tary policy, foreign relations, defence .... general economic pol-
icy, economic relations, including where any of the following af-
fect more than one constituent unit, transport, energy supplies,
pipelines and water management, and other matters to be de-
cided."'" A considerably longer list of functions was assigned to
the constituent units, with no clear indication of where any
residual powers would reside.
The Precursor to the VOP explicitly stated the philosophy
on which its allocation was based: that as far as possible, citizens
should only have to deal with authorities of their own ethnicity.
Thus, education, culture, licensing of professions and trades, use
of natural resources, health care, control of financial institu-
tions, police, and taxation for all the above would be local re-
sponsibilities. For the rest, certain powers were allocated respec-
tively either to the central government, to proposed "independ-
ent authorities," or to be shared between the central and the
provincial authorities. No explicit statement about residual pow-
ers was included.
The Constitutional Principles set out in the actual VOP, pe-
culiarly enough, did not address this issue at all, though from
the circumstances of its presentation it was implied that it was
based on the precursor proposal whose details would apply
where the Principles were silent.
The Invincible Plan, on the other hand, restricted itself to a
mere statement of the residual rule (Art. 11.3): "All governmen-
tal functions and powers, except those assigned by this Constitu-
tional Agreement to the Union ... or to any of its institutions,
shall be those of the Constituent Republics." Actually, the Con-
stitutional Agreement would have vested very few functions in
the Union, mostly responsibility, though not exclusive (see F be-
low), for foreign relations and the maintenance of three central
courts: the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the
Human Rights Court, each of which could review appropriate
41. Cutileiro Principles, supra note 4, para. C.2.
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decisions of the Republic courts while also exercising certain
original jurisdiction.
In the BH Federation Constitution, one of the most closely
negotiated and, consequently, elaborate provisions is Chapter III
on "Division of Responsibilities Between the Federation Govern-
ment and the Cantons," which assigns some ten areas exclu-
sively to the Federation, specifies nine for which both the Feder-
ation Government and the Cantons have responsibility (with an
elaborate set of rules for how these joint responsibilities are to
be exercised), and lists twelve exclusively for the Cantons, to
which it also assigns "all responsibility not expressly granted to
the Federation Government." Finally, there are also require-
ments that the Cantons delegate some of their powers to their
municipalities, especially where such municipalities are of an
ethnicity different from the majority of the Canton.
The tentative Contact Group draft would have provided
that: "All governmental functions and powers, except those as-
signed by this Constitutional Agreement to the Union or to any
of its institutions, or such as may be required to carry out by the
Union in order to fulfill its international obligations, shall be
those of the [two] Constituent Entities."
The September 1995 Preliminary Agreements assigned "for-
eign policy" to "Bosnia and Herzegovina" (the then tentative
name for the central state) with additional matters to be agreed
later, and all residual powers to the two "Entities."
The new BH Constitution assigns responsibility for the fol-
lowing to the central government: foreign policy; foreign trade
policy; customs policy; monetary policy (to be implemented
through a Central Bank); finances for the institutions of the cen-
tral government and for international obligations; immigration,
refugee matters, and asylum; international and inter-Entity crim-
inal law enforcement; common and international communica-
tion facilities; inter-Entity transportation; and air traffic con-
trol.4" "All governmental functions and powers not expressly as-
signed by th[e] Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia and
Herzegovina shall be those of the Entities."43 It should be noted
that several other Annexes to the GFA, which in form at least
have coequal status with the Constitution and are referred to in
42. BH CONST. art. III.1(a)-(j).
43. Id. art. III.(a).
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its Article. III.5(a)," make special arrangements concerning
Human Rights (Annex 6), Refugees and Displaced Persons (An-
nex 7), the establishment of a Commission to Preserve National
Monuments (Annex 8), and the establishment of "Bosnia and
Herzegovina Public Corporations," including especially a "Trans-
portation Corporation" (Annex 9). All of these arrangements
assign specified additional responsibilities to the two Entities
and/or to the central government, but especially to the latter.
Furthermore, the Constitution foresees that the Entities will
agree to assign other responsibilities to the central government
"including utilization of energy resources and cooperative eco-
nomic projects."45
E. Effectiveness of the Central Government
The other principal factor to be adjusted to achieve a bal-
ance between the demands of the parties relating to the struc-
ture of Bosnia is the degree to which the central government will
be able to function if one of the parties is intent on stopping
some action, or perhaps all actions - ostensibly to protect itself
from a majority created by the other ethnic party or parties, but
with the possible goal of bringing the state itself to a halt. In this
respect, various factors must be considered.
The initial point to be decided is the composition of the
organs of the central government, in particular the legislature,
the executive (invariably a multi-person "Presidency" and a Cabi-
net), and even the highest courts. In particular, should these
organs reflect the actual numbers of the various "constituent
peoples" (the Muslims, the Serbs, the Croats, and possibly a
group of "Others"), or be divided mostly on a strict 1:1:1 basis
(to reflect the three constituent entities or parties or principal
constituent peoples), or perhaps be divided on a 1:1 basis in
those instances in which, nominally, only two entities participate.
The Cutileiro Principles foresaw a bicameral central legisla-
ture with a directly elected Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber
of Constituent Units in which each of the three "units" would be
equally represented; on specified important matters the latter
44. The Dayton version of that provision actually refers to "Annexes 5 through 8 to
the General Framework Agreement," but, presumably, this is a misprint, as Annex 5 is
irrelevant while Annex 9 is relevant.
45. BH CONST. art. III.5(b).
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Chamber would decide by a majority of four-fifths, which would
mean that if the representatives of any unit were united they
could block a decision. The makeup of the executive was not
defined, though it was provided that the "composition of the
civil service and thejudiciary... would reflect proportionally the
national composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina."46 Constitu-
tional questions would be resolved by a special Tribunal, on
which each of the constituent units would have one member,
while for a period of no less than five years, there would be four
"impartial elements drawn from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina
and its neighbouring states;" thus at least the Tribunal could not
become deadlocked.
The Precursor to the VOP would have provided for a bicam-
eral legislature, with a lower house elected on a proportional
representation basis from the country as a whole and the upper
house to be appointed by and from the provincial governments
- without any indication as to whether each of the 7-10 prov-
inces would be equally represented. The provincial governors
would, collectively, have constituted the Presidency, a principally
ceremonial organ except for its strictly circumscribed appointing
functions, with a powerless President presiding; there would
have been no unanimity or consensus requirement "to avoid the
possibility of paralysis."4 7 The Prime Minister would be chosen
by the lower house, and Ministers appointed by the PM with the
approval of the Presidency and with "due account for Group bal-
ance." As to the courts, there would not have been (here or in
any of the later proposals) a parallel system of provincial and
central courts, but the courts of first instance and initial appeal
would have been provincial, while the highest courts would have
been central with the judges reflecting "group balance." On
these bases, the Central Government could have been poten-
tially effective under all except perhaps the most extreme cir-
cumstances. Again, the Constitutional Principles in the VOP did
not give any useful guidance on any of these details.
Under the Invincible Plan, the unicameral Parliament
would have consisted of 120 representatives, 40 elected by each
of the Constituent Republic legislatures. It could adopt laws by a
46. Cutiliero Principles, supra note 4, para. C.3.
47. Report of the Secretary-General on the International Conference on the Former Yugosla-
via, supra note 7, Annex VII, supra note 4, at 45.
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simple majority of the members from each Republic and, thus,
the members from any Republic could block an adoption. The
Presidency would consist of the President of, or an appointee of
the legislature of each of the three Constituent Republics, the
chairmanship rotating among these every four months; its deci-
sions would have required a consensus. There would have been
a Council of Ministers, with the Prime Minister appointed and,
possibly, removed by the Presidency (acting by consensus) with
the post rotating on an annual basis among the nominees of the
Presidents of the three Republics. The Supreme Court would
have had four judges appointed by the Presidency, with no two
from the same constituent peoples. The Constitutional Court
would have judges from the three principal constituent peoples
and would have been required to act by consensus - but, if par-
alyzed, decisions would have been referred to a standing 5-mem-
ber arbitral tribunal of ICJjudges or members of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration. The Human Rights Court would have
been established under the Council of Europe arrangement dis-
cussed in section G.2 below. In other words, practically all the
governmental organs could easily have been blocked from act-
ing, except for the Constitutional and Human Rights Courts in
which, ultimately, foreign judges could decide.
The Federation Constitution, the first genuinely negotiated
text among those here considered, adopted a much more so-
phisticated and nuanced approach to these questions. The BH
Federation Legislature consists of two Houses. The House of
Representatives has 140 members elected by proportional repre-
sentation from the country as a whole, subject to a normal "5%
clause."48 The House of Peoples has 30 Bosniac (i.e. principally
Muslim) members and an equal number of Croats (even though
they represent only about 20-30% of the population), plus a
number of delegates representing "Others" depending on the
ratio of such representatives in the cantonal legislatures (which,
therefore, could range from very few to potentially a far larger
number than the specified number of Bosniac and Croat mem-
bers). In the House of Peoples, decisions would normally be
48. BH CONsT. art. IVA3(1). This clause, as developed in post-World War II Eu-
ropean constitutional practice, means that any party receiving less than 5% of the votes
cast is not represented in the legislature - even if those votes would mathematically
entitle it to some seats. The purpose of this rule is to reduce the number of splinter
parties.
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taken by a simple majority, but on matters "that concern the vital
interest of any of the constituent peoples" adoption of a decision
requires a majority of both the Bosniac and of the Croat dele-
gates (i.e. permitting half of either group to block). Whether a
question is, however, indeed of vital interest, can be appealed to
the Constitutional Court, which during a transitional five-year
period will have a number of foreign members to prevent a
deadlock. The executive consists, first of all, of a President and a
Vice-President, from different constituent peoples and elected
by both Houses, with the requirement in the House of Peoples
for a majority of both the Bosniac and the Croat delegations.
Most important decisions of the President, such as the appoint-
ment of the Prime Minister, require the concurrence of the Vice-
President. As to the Cabinet, its decisions that concern a "vital
interest" require consensus, with elaborate provisions for break-
ing impasses by referring matters to the Constitutional Court
and to the President or Vice-President (the choice depending on
an elaborate rule). Altogether, during at least the initial 5-year
period when the Constitutional Court has three foreign judges
among its nine members, it should be possible to avoid cata-
strophic deadlocks in the Federation Government.
The tentative Contact Group "Union" constitution on these
points rather resembled the Invincible constitutional agreement.
However, the new BH Constitution, as already somewhat fore-
shadowed in the September 1995 Preliminary Agreements, relies
on quite different devices to ensure the effectiveness of the cen-
tral government:
1. The legislature consists of a bicameral Parliamentary As-
sembly (Art. IV): a House of Peoples comprising 15 Dele-
gates, 10 from the Federation (5 Muslims and 5 Croats) se-
lected by the respective groups in the House of Peoples of the
Federation and 5 from the Republika Srpska selected by its
National Assembly; a House of Representatives comprising 42
Representatives, 28 from the Federation and 14 from the
Republika Srpska, to be directly elected from these respective
Entities in accordance with an election law to be adopted by
the Parliamentary Assembly - except that the first election is
to take place in accordance with Annex 3 to the GFA.
All legislative decisions of the Parliamentary Assembly re-
quire the approval of both chambers. In each, decisions are
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normally taken by a majority of those present and voting, pro-
vided that:
(a) Either the majority includes at least one-third of the
votes of the members from each Entity or, if that is not possi-
ble, the dissenting votes do not include two-thirds of the
members from either Entity. (In other words, a solid block of
just over two-thirds of the members of either Entity in either
chamber can block any legislation.)
(b) If 3 or more Bosniac, Serb, or Croat members of the
House of Peoples declare a proposed decision "to be destruc-
tive of a vital interest of [its] people," then the decision re-
quires a majority of the members of each such group present
and voting, unless 3 or more Bosniac, Serb, or Croat mem-
bers object to the invocation of the vital interest provision, in
which case this issue is to be resolved within five days by a
tripartite joint commission or otherwise by the Constitutional
Court through an expedited procedure (which, however, may
only review "procedural regularity").
2. The executive consists of a Presidency and a Council of
Ministers (Art. V):
(a) The 3-member Presidency consists of one Bosniac
and one Croat member elected directly by the voters of the
Federation and one Serb elected directly by the voters of the
Republika Srpska for four-year terms. The Presidency is to en-
deavor to reach all its decisions by consensus, but decisions
can be adopted by two members unless within three days the
dissenting member declares the proposed decision "to be de-
structive of a vital interest of the Entity... from which he was
elected," and such objection is confirmed within ten days by a
two-thirds vote of the Republika Srpska National Assembly if
the objection was made by the Serb member of the Presi-
dency or of the Bosniac or Croat members of the House of
Peoples of the Federation if the objection was made by the
Bosniac or Croat member of the Presidency. (In other words,
any member of the Presidency, if supported by an appropri-
ate two-thirds vote in his Entity's Legislature, can block Presi-
dency decisions.) The Constitution does not provide for re-
view by the Constitutional Court.
(b) The Council of Ministers consists of a Chair ap-
pointed by the Presidency and approved by the House of Rep-
resentatives, and of a Foreign Minister, a Foreign Trade Min-
ister, and other Ministers appointed by the Chair and ap-
proved by the House of Representatives. No more than two-
thirds of the Ministers may be from the Federation and Dep-
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uty Ministers may not "be of the same constituent people as
their Ministers." The Council must resign on a vote of no-
confidence by the Parliamentary Assembly.
3. The judicature of the central government consists solely of
a Constitutional Court of 9 members: 4 to be selected by the
House of Representatives of the Federation, 2 by the National
Assembly of the Republika Srpska, and 3 (who may not be
citizens of Bosnia or of any neighboring state) by the Presi-
dent of the European Court of Human Rights after consulta-
tion with the BH Presidency, though after five years the Par-
liamentary Assembly may by law provide for a different way of
selecting these 3judges.4 9 The Constitutional Court has juris-
diction to decide disputes that arise under the Constitution
between the Entities or between the central government and
one or both Entities, or between institutions of the central
government. It also has appellate jurisdiction over constitu-
tional issues arising in any other court in Bosnia and Herze-
govina or to respond to questions addressed to it by any such
court as to the compatibility of any law with the Constitution
or with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms.
It should be noted that aside from the Constitutional
Court established by the Constitution, several Annexes to the
GFA provide for other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies or dis-
putes resolution mechanisms:
(a) For the arbitration of any dispute between the Enti-
ties (Annex 5);
(b) For the establishment of a Human Rights Chamber,
as described further in section G.2 below (Annex 6);
(c) For the establishment of a Commission for Displaced
Persons and Refugees, as described further in Section G.3 be-
low (Annex 7).
F. Foreign Relations
The arrangements concerning the conduct of foreign rela-
tions, whether considered in only the classical narrow political
sense or also encompassing foreign economic relations, became
particularly convoluted and unusual in a number of the propos-
als. These reflected, on the one hand, the Muslim concept that
the ability to conduct an effective foreign policy and to have a
monopoly over this function is a principal indicium of a state
49. BH CONsT. art. VI.
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under international law, and, on the other hand, the desire of
the Bosnian Serbs to have their entity within any union wield
foreign relations powers as extensively as possible, and, in partic-
ular, the power to establish close relations with Serbia or the
FRY. As a result, some of the proposals described below attempt
to assign unprecedentedly wide foreign relations powers to sub-
sidiary parts of a "state."
In the Cutileiro Principles, "foreign relations" was one of
the subjects as to which the central government organs could
legislate, though "decisions concerning relations between Bosnia
and Herzegovina and [neighboring states] ... would be decided
in the Chamber of Constituent Units [in which each of the three
'units' would be equally represented] by a majority of four-fifth
of the total number of representatives in it."" °
In the Precursor to the VOP, the central government was
explicitly assigned "exclusive responsibility" for "Foreign Affairs
(including membership in international organizations)" and for
"International commerce (customs duties; quotas)," and in a
provision that appeared merely to state the obvious but that
proved to be one of the most controversial of the entire draft
(opposed by both the Serbs and the Croats), it was specified
that: "The provinces are not to be allowed to entertain formal
international or inter-provincial ties, except with the permission
of the central government; they are to have no international
legal personality.""
In spite of this opposition, the VOP itself expressed, as its
second Constitutional principle, that: "The provinces shall not
have any international legal personality and may not enter into
agreements with foreign states or with international organiza-
tions."52
In the Invincible Constitutional Agreement, the distribution
of "International Relations" functions became more complex.
First of all, approval by the Security Council of continued mem-
bership in the United Nations became a condition for the entry
into force of the Agreement. Except for the membership appli-
cations to other U.N. system organizations (which were directly
50. Cutiliero Principles, supra note 4, para. C.2.
51. Report of the Secretaiy-General on the International Conference on the Former Yugosla-
via, supra note 7, Annex VII, 1 II.A.1, 8 and II, final sentence, at 46-47.
52. Id. Annex II, art. I, Principle (2).
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foreseen in the Constitutional Agreement), applications to other
international organizations would have required a consensus de-
cision of the Presidency; on the other hand, any of the three
"Constituent Republics" could apply for membership in interna-
tional organizations "if such membership would not be inconsis-
tent with the interests of the [Union] or of either of the other
Constituent Republics." As to treaties, the Union would stay a
party to those treaties to which the BH Republic had been a
party, except for those entered into after November 18, 1990
(the date after which the Bosnian Serbs considered they no
longer participated in the Republic) which would be denounced
unless the Union Parliament decided otherwise. New treaties
could be entered into by decision of the Parliament, but "[t]o
the extent such participation would involve responsibilities to be
carried out by the Constituent Republics, their advance approval
must be secured, except in respect of [the human rights treaties
listed in the Constitutional Agreement]." Moreover, the Constit-
uent Republics could, if eligible, become parties to international
treaties subject to the same restriction as mentioned above in
respect to membership in international organizations.
In the Federation Constitution, relatively little is said on this
subject. In the allocation of responsibilities between the Federa-
tion's central and Cantonal Governments, "foreign affairs" is
clearly assigned to the former. Indeed, as the Federation itself
was conceived as only a subsidiary unit of the continuing BH Re-
public, which might eventually be replaced by the proposed BH
Union, the Federation Constitution states that "[t]he interna-
tional relations of the Federation are based on the international
legal personality, territorial integrity, and continuity of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina.15 3 Nevertheless, it was fore-
seen that the BH Federation might enter into treaties, and there
are constitutional provisions as to the responsibility therefor of
several Federation organs. In particular, it was foreseen in an
instrument signed simultaneously with the proposed Federation
Constitution, that the Federation would enter into a Confedera-
tion with the Republic of Croatia that would not "change the
international identity or legal personality of Croatia or of the
Federation," but could encompass, inter alia, a customs union, a
53. Proposed Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra
note 15, art VII.l, 33 I.L.M. at 744.
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common market, and a monetary union.54 In fact, after some
months, the interest of both potential parties to the Confedera-
tion in that type of close relationship faded, and instead they
entered into certain specific transit agreements that originally
were meant to constitute part of the Confederal arrangements.
The Contact Group's tentative plan for a Union Constitu-
tion would, in respect of participation in international organiza-
tions and treaties, have tracked the Invincible Plan almost pre-
cisely, except to specify that disagreements concerning the re-
strictions on international participation by the Constituent
Entities would be decided by the Constitutional Court. How-
ever, in deference to Serb insistence that the Serb entity be
granted the same right to confederate (presumably with Serbia
or the FRY) as had originally been foreseen for the Federation, it
was to be provided that either "Constituent Entity may enter into
cooperative arrangements and parallel special relationships with
neighbouring countries," subject to certain restrictions that
could also be interpreted by the Constitutional Court; the pre-
cise formulation of this entire provision was one of the most con-
troversial aspects of the entire draft.
The new BH Constitution follows the conventional line of
concentrating all foreign relations functions and powers in the
organs of the central government, including the Presidency, the
Council of Ministers, and the Parliamentary Assembly. The sole
residues of the former, dubiously wide, foreign affairs functions
proposed for the Entities in earlier drafts are that:
(a) The Entities shall have the right to establish special paral-
lel relationships with neighboring states consistent with the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina.
(d) Each Entity may also enter into agreements with states
and international organizations with the consent of the Par-
liamentary Assembly. The Parliamentary Assembly may also
provide by law that certain types of agreements do not re-
quire such consent.55
Evidently the background of these otherwise perhaps obscure
54. Preliminary Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Confederation Be-
tween the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, supra
note 16, arts. 1, 4(2)(b), 4(2)(d), 33 I.L.M. at 611-12.
55. BH CONsT. art. 111.2 (a), (d).
QUEST FOR A BOSNIAN CONSTITUTION
provisions is to be found in the work of the Contact Group re-
cited above. The Constitutional Court is explicitly given jurisdic-
tion to determine:
Whether an Entity's decision to establish a special parallel re-
lationship with a neighboring state is consistent with this Con-
stitution, including provisions concerning the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.5 6
To the extent that the respective constitutions of the Feder-
ation and of the Republika Srpska do purport to assign any
wider foreign relations powers to these Entities, such provisions
evidently become ineffective by the entry into force of the new
BH Constitution. In addition, within three months thereafter,
the Entities are required to amend their constitutions to con-
form with the BH Constitution."
Incidentally, paragraph 5 of Annex II to the Constitution on
"Transitional Arrangements" provides a special procedure for
denouncing treaties ratified by the BH Republic from January 1,
1992. Presumably, therefore, other treaties to which the BH Re-
public became a party by succession from the SFRY, or those it
ratified but that are not denounced, stay in force for Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
G. Human Rights
It can be argued that human rights violations, such as "eth-
nic cleansing," are at the very heart of and indeed constitute the
real basis of the conflict in Bosnia, and that, consequently, any
stable resolution must include strong and effective provisions to
prevent further violations and to undo and/or punish, as far as
possible, those that have already occurred. As a result, all the
diverse proposals that the international community has made,
starting even before the current conflict was ignited, have heavily
emphasized the need to include in any new governmental ar-
rangements unusually powerful substantive and procedural pro-
visions for the protection of human rights in general, and those
of minorities in particular. As a matter of fact, these human
rights provisions have, generally, not been considered controver-
sial by any of the parties and at most minor adjustments have
56. Id. art. VI.3(a), 1st sub-para.
57. GFA, supra note 29, Annex 4, art. XII.2.
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been demanded. This, of course, does not signify that all the
parties are devoted to human rights, but that on the one hand
they see a tactical advantage in such a pretense and on the other
that they are genuinely interested in seeing their own people
protected in those situations where they live in territory con-
trolled by another party.
These considerations have led to the development of a
number of unusual or even unprecedented devices concerning
both the substantive and the procedural protection of human
rights. Because I recently analyzed these devices in some de-
tail,58 the present study sets out only a general description.
In the Peace Agreement, almost all of these devices are used
or at least reflected in three somewhat overlapping instruments:
(a) The Preamble and Article II of and Annex I to the new
BH Constitution (GFA, Annex 4);
(b) The Agreement on Human Rights ("HR Agreement")
(GFA, Annex 6);
(c) The Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons
("Refugee Agreement") (GFA, Annex 7).
1. Substantive Standards
Starting with the Carrington proposals, which of course re-
ferred not to Bosnia specifically but constituted an attempt to
reconstruct all of the former Yugoslavia, two types of techniques
have been used, one consistently and the other occasionally, to
specify the human rights to be observed. The consistent tech-
nique has been to incorporate by reference a list of worldwide or
European human rights instruments (mostly treaties, but also
some declarations and agreed reports)5 9 whose provisions are to
58. Paul C. Szasz, Protecting Human and Minority Rights in Bosnia: A Documentary
Survey of International Proposals, 25 CAL. WESTERN INT'L L.J. 237, 237-310 (1995) [herein-
after Protecting Human and Minority Rights in Bosnia]. That study, however, predates the
Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement.
59. For example, the list annexed to the BH Federation Constitution, supra note
15, included the following instruments: Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
58 (Cmnd. 4421); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
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be observed, in most cases, as immediately applicable law bind-
ing on all governmental organs of the central state as well as of
the constituent entities, and referable directly (i.e. self-executing
without any need for legislative incorporation) in all courts. In
addition, Bosnia would be required to become a party to these
instruments wherever and as soon as possible, thus adding inter-
national obligations to the domestic strictures of the proposed
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II),June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442; Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,
Europ. T.S. No. 5 and Protocols thereto; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268; Convention on the Nationality of
Married Women, Feb. 20, 1957, G.A. Res. 1040, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
RES/1040(XI) (1957), 309 U.N.T.S. 65; European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529
U.N.T.S. 89, Europ. T.S. No. 35, and Protocol 1, May 5, 1988, Europ. T.S. No. 128;
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (en-
tered into force Dec. 13, 1975); International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5
I.L.M. 352 (entered into forceJan. 4, 1969); International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6 (Cmnd. 6702);
Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967); Second Optional Protocol, opened for signature Dec.
15, 1989, G.A- Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 206, U.N. Doc.
A.49/49 (1990); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6 (Cmnd. 6702); Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intol-
erance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N.
GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 205;
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984), 1991 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
107 (Cm. 1775); 1987 European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 1152 (1988);
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25, 1992
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 44 (Cm. 1976); International Convention on the Protection of Rights
of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, opened for signature May 22, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 1517 (1991); 1990 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference
on the Human Dimension of the CSCE [Part IV],June 24, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1318;
1990 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation on the Rights of
Minorities 1 10-13; 1992 [U.N.] Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (1993); 1992 European Charter for Regional and
Minority Languages, Nov. 5, 1992, Europ. T.S. No. 148.
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constitutional law and also ensuring international monitoring
provided for in many of the instruments.
In the Carrington draft some 8 instruments or groups of
instruments were cited specifically. In the Precursor to the VOP,
17 instruments were named and the same were also listed as ap-
plying in the interim period provided by the VOP; 19 appeared
in the Invincible Plan and 21 in the Federation Constitution and
in the Contact Group's tentative draft.
In addition, the Carrington draft also explicitly listed twelve
fundamental rights, such as, "the right to life." No such listing
appears in the subsequent proposals, until the Federation Con-
stitution; in the course of negotiating that instrument, a list of 18
rights or bundles of rights agreed to as applying to all persons
and 2 rights that only extend to citizens. The purpose of setting
out these rights was not to strengthen the international list,
which, of course, included instruments that are far more com-
prehensive and detailed (in particular the two 1966 Interna-
tional Covenants60 and the 1950 European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 61 with its Protocols),
but optical and didactic; to show citizens the fundamental rights
they can rely on without merely referring them to titles of inter-
national documents to which they were unlikely to have ready
access.
Both the new BH Constitution and the HR Agreement util-
ize both these devices to establish the substantive human rights
to be observed. Both rely primarily on the 1950 European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and the Protocols thereto, which are referred to in the
respective texts (BH Constitution, Art. 11.2; HR Agreement, Ch.
One, Art. I, chapeau), and supplement these with 15 other U.N.
or Council of Europe treaties that are listed in Annex I to the
BH Constitution and in an Appendix to the HR Agreement.62
60. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 59, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, supra note 59, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6.
61. Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 59, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
62. These lists are identical to each other, except that the Appendix to the HR
Agreement also lists the 1950 European Convention; they include all the treaties listed
in the Annex to the BH Federation Constitution except for the 1961 European Social
Charter and Protocol 1 thereto, but omit all the Declarations listed in that Annex and
add the 1994 [Council of Europe] Framework Convention for the Protection of Na-
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In addition, both the Constitution and the HR Agreement
include an identical list of specified rights, ranging from "[t] he
right to life" to freedom from discrimination.63
2. Procedural Devices
In addition to the requirement that all governmental organs
and, in particular, the courts follow and enforce the applicable
substantive human rights provisions, a variety of procedural de-
vices were developed, most of which had, at least for an initial
period, certain international elements.
The Carrington draft contained a proposal for the establish-
ment of a Court of Human Rights, an idea that was preserved in
the human rights provisions added to the Cutileiro Principles
and in the Precursor to the VOP. In order to give greater au-
thority to a such a prospective human rights court, ICFY pro-
posed to the Council of Europe, and the latter then established a
procedure whereby it could appoint a majority of European
judges to an appropriate national "control body" established by a
non-member of the Council.' In all subsequently proposed or
negotiated instruments, and in particular the Invincible Plan,
the Federation Constitution, and the proposed Union Constitu-
tion, provisions were made for the establishment of such a
Human Rights Court, to constitute the highest court of appeals
on all human rights questions. Each of these instruments pro-
vided that the Court would have one judge from each "constitu-
ent people" (including the "others") and a suitable number of
European judges equal to one more than the number of domes-
tic judges. In each case, this Court was designed to function with
its partly foreign composition until Bosnia becomes a member of
the Council of Europe and, thus, subject directly to its human
rights mechanisms.
In the Peace Agreement, this court has been transmuted by
the HR Agreement (Ch. Two, Part C) into a "Human Rights
Chamber," consisting of 14 members, acting either in two panels
tional Minorities - which had not yet been adopted at the time the Federation Consti-
tution was concluded.
63. BH CONST. art. I1.3(a)-(m), 4; HR Agreement art. I(1)-(14).
64. Resolution on the Control of Respect for Human Rights in European States
Not Yet Members of the Council of Europe, Res. 93(6), Council of Europe, Comm. of
Ministers, 489th mtg. (1993), reprinted in Protecting Human and Minority Rights in Bosnia,
supra note 58, Addendum 9, at 302-03.
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of 7 or in plenary, of which the Federation (organ unspecified)
is to appoint 4 members, the Republika Srpska 2 members, and
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, acting
under Resolution 93(6), 8 members who are not to be citizens of
Bosnia or of any neighboring country - except that this latter
arrangement is to cease after five years unless the parties to the
HR Agreement (the BH Republic, the BH Federation, and the
Republika Srpska) agree to prolong it. The Chamber is not, as
previously conceived, to act as the highest appellate court on
human rights questions, but instead is authorized to receive ap-
plications from a wide variety of sources (e.g. victims, NGOs). It
has broad discretion as to whether or not to consider an applica-
tion and, if it does so, whether first to try to reach a friendly
settlement. In the absence of a settlement, it issues a decision
determining the factual situation and the steps to be taken by
any party to the HR Agreement, which the latter have under-
taken to implement fully.
Another device that has been uniformly provided for, start-
ing with the Precursor to VOP, is relatively powerful
Ombudsmen, whose initial and basic functions would be set out
in the central Constitution. Again, each constituent people
would be represented, and the initial appointments would be
made by an appropriate international body, and subsequently by
a domestic legislative organ. The Federation Ombudsmen have
already begun to function.6" Again, in the Peace Agreement this
idea has been somewhat transmuted and included in the HR
Agreement (Ch. Two, Part B), which establishes the Office of
the Human Rights Ombudsman - headed by a single individual
to be initially appointed for a five-year term by the Chairman-in-
Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (OSCE) and thereafter by the BH Presidency. The Office
is to receive allegations of human rights violations, unless these
are referred directly to the HR Chamber, and is to investigate
such allegations - for which it has broad powers - and to issue
reports, any disregard of which by a party may be referred to
appropriate national or international authorities.
65. The "Regulations on the method of executing their functions and on their
internal organization" adopted by the Federation Ombudsmen onJanuary 21, 1995, are
reprinted in Protecting Human and Minority Rights in Bosnia, supra note 58, Addendum
10, at 304-10.
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Some of the proposals have also provided for the operation
of mixed domestic and international, or wholly international,
human rights monitoring missions for at least a transitional pe-
riod. These missions would have supplemented the normal in-
ternational monitoring provided for by several of the human
rights treaties to which Bosnia would be required to become a
party. The Peace Agreement does not establish any interna-
tional organ specifically charged with monitoring human rights
in Bosnia, though both the "High Representative," who is to co-
ordinate all civilian aspects of the implementation of the Peace
Agreement (GFA, Annex 10), and the International Police Task
Force (GFA, Annex 11) have certain relevant competencies.
The HR Agreement does require (Ch. Three, Article XIII.1-4)
the Parties to variously encourage, promote, invite, allow access
to, and to cooperate with human rights NGOs and IGOs, includ-
ing "any international human rights monitoring mechanisms es-
tablished for Bosnia and Hezegovina;" this, presumably leaves
open the possibility that such mechanisms might be established,
individually or jointly, by the United Nations, the European
Union, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE.
Finally, every proposed constitutional instrument, as well as
the BH Federation Constitution, provided that they may not be
amended in such a way as to eliminate or diminish substantive or
procedural human rights provisions. This is also true of the new
BH Constitution, which specifies that:
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. No amendment to
this Constitution may eliminate or diminish any of the rights
and freedoms referred to in Article II of this Constitution or
the present paragraph.66
Technically, this protective device does not extend to the HR
and Refugee Agreements, which in form are independent inter-
national treaties, whose possible denunciation may be governed
by Article 56 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties. 67
66. BH CONST. art. X.2.
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 56, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 345, 8 I.L.M. 679, 699. It should be noted that, at the time of the initial-
ling or signing, at least two of the three parties (i.e. the BH Federation and the Repub-
lika Srpska) did not have generally recognized international legal personalities as states,
and after signing they became mere "Entities" within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the legal
continuation of the third party to the HR Agreement (the BH Republic).
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3. Reversal of Ethnic Cleansing
In addition to the normal human rights provisions, each of
the proposals contained largely similar provisions designed to
undo, as far as possible, the effects of ethnic cleansing, i.e., the
forcible and generally brutal removal of ethnic groups from ar-
eas controlled by another, whether on the basis of long-estab-
lished majorities or of recent conquest. These provisions reflect
the demands in several General Assembly and Security Council
resolutions.6 8
In particular, the proposals uniformly provided (and the
Federation Constitution provides) that all refugees and dis-
placed persons must be permitted (but not required) to return
to their former homes. In addition, they are entitled to reclaim
their former property and to be compensated for any that can-
not be returned to them - normally because it has been de-
stroyed. In this connection, the proposals declare invalid all
statements or commitments made under duress. In the Peace
Agreement, these principles are first stated briefly in the new BH
Constitution,69 and then largely repeated in the Refugee Agree-
ment;70 the latter, however, fleshes out these provisions and adds
numerous details regarding their implementation.71
Some instruments provided for the creation of special do-
mestic or semi-domestic organs to assist in this process and some
assigned certain new organs, such as the Ombudsmen, tasks in
this connection. In the Peace Agreement, the principal respon-
sibility for implementing these provisions is assigned to a Com-
mission for Displaced Persons and Refugees established by the
Refugee Agreement (Ch. Two) and consisting of 4 members ap-
pointed by the Federation, 2 by the Republika Srpska, and 3,
initially for five years, by the President of the European Court of
Human Rights and thereafter by the BH Presidency; the Com-
mission has extensive powers, in particular in deciding on claims
for the restoration of property or compensation in lieu thereof.
68. See Protecting Human and Minority Rights in Bosnia, supra note 58, at 250 n.63
(listing General Assembly and Security Council resolutions condemning practice of
"ethnic cleansing").
69. BH CONST. art. II.4.
70. GFA, supra note 29, Annex 7, Ch. One, art. 1.1.
71. Id. Annex 7, Ch. One, arts. I-VI.
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4. Cooperation with the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal
In the Invincible Plan and in earlier constitutional propos-
als, no account was yet taken of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, which had been established
by the Security Council in May 199372 but which only became
active in the course of 1994 and issued its first indictments in
November of that year.73
The Federation Constitution prohibits any person convicted
of war crimes or against whom proceedings concerning such
crimes have been initiated (without specifying the jurisdiction),
from being elected to any public office within the Federation.
The new BH Constitution provides that:
No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the In-
ternational Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [sic], and no
person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has
failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal,
may stand as a candidate or hold any appointive, elective, or
other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina.74
In addition, in the GFA itself, the parties thereto agree to "coop-
erate fully with all entities.., authorized by the United Nations
Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to co-
operate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and
other violations of international humanitarian law."75 There are
also a few other scattered references to the obligation of various
specified organs to cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal.
H. Military Arrangements
The Cutileiro Principles cautiously set aside for later consid-
eration both the maintenance of armed forces in the future and
the fate of the then existing army. The Precursor to the VOP
72. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
73. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Indictment
Against Nikolic, Nov. 7, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 997 (1995); International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia: Indictment Against Meakic & Others, Feb. 13, 1995, 34 I.L.M.
1013 (1995).
74. BH CONST. art. IX.1.
75. GFA, supra note 29, art. IX.
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would have required the military to be entirely under the con-
trol of the central government, with group rotation of the key
command posts and both integration and ethnic balance in the
force - to be initially supervised by ICFY; the police were to be
entirely provincial and no other armed forces would be permit-
ted. Because all parties doubted the practicability of integrating
their armed forces, which by the fall of 1992 had been fighting
each other viciously for almost half a year, the VOP itself pro-
vided for progressive demilitarization under U.N. and EC super-
vision. The Invincible Plan similarly provided that neither the
Union nor the Constituent Republics could have armed forces
and that the existing ones would be progressively disarmed and
disbanded under U.N. and EC supervision.
The Federation Constitution assigned to the BH Federation
Government exclusive responsibility for, "[o]irganizing and con-
ducting the defense of the Federation and protecting its bor-
ders, including establishing a joint command of all military
forces in the Federation."76 The Contact Group's tentative
Union Constitution would have required the two Constituent
Entities, the BH Federation and the Republika Srpska, to con-
clude agreements limiting their respective armed forces in con-
formity with established Conference for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe ("CSCE") and Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe ("CFE") documents and agreements and, in
any event, would have prohibited them from threatening or us-
ing force against each other.
In the new BH Constitution, national defense is conspicu-
ously missing from the responsibilities assigned to the central
government, which implies (by Art. 111.3 (a)) that this is a func-
tion of the two Entities. This implication is reinforced by a some-
what obscure provision relating to the Presidency:
Standing Committee
(a) Each member of the Presidency shall, by virtue of the of-
fice, have civilian command authority over armed forces....
All armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall operate
consistently with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(b) The members of the Presidency shall select a standing
76. Proposed Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra
note 15, art. II1.1(b), 33 I.L.M. at 749-50.
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Committed on Military Matters to coordinate the activities of
armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The members of
the Presidency shall be members of the Standing Commit-
tee.
77
In addition, the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace
Agreement (GFA, Annex IA) contains extensive, albeit essen-
tially transitional, provisions regarding the redeployment of the
existing national military forces in Bosnia7s and for the establish-
ment of a Joint Military Commission.79 More importandy, the
Agreement on Regional Stabilization (GFA, Annex IB) provides
in its Article IV ("Measures for Sub-Regional Arms Control") for
the establishment of numerical limits on the holdings of speci-
fied weapons (as defined in the CFE Treaty), of the FRY, Croatia,
the BH Federation, and the Republika Srpska, roughly in the
ratio of their respective populations.
CONCLUSION
The disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the almost in-
evitable consequence of the fragmentation of the carefully bal-
anced mosaic of nationalities of the SFRY, not along any natural
fault lines but along the somewhat artificial boundaries set in the
1974 SFRY Constitution. The proposed reconstruction of Bosnia
is, therefore, a singularly complicated and delicate affair that
must be designed both to stop the current military conflict and
to substitute at least a potentially viable constitutional structure.
The three-sided nature and bitterness of the conflict and the ex-
pressed unwillingness of a substantial fraction of the Bosnian
population to live peacefully with other Bosnians have led to a
plethora of unprecedented and necessarily experimental consti-
tutional proposals. The prospects for success of those that were
finally adopted unfortunately depends less on the ingenuity of
their design than on the will of the international community to
enforce any arrangement made by or imposed on the parties.
77. BH CONST. art. V.5.
78. GFA, supra note 29, Annex 1A, art. IV.
79. Id. Annex 1A, art. VIII.
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